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IRREVOCABLE TRANSFERS AND A RECONVEYANCE OF POWER TO THE
TRANSFEROR--SEcTON 2038 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1954
Estate of Reed v. United States, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-6413,
75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87, 477 (M.D. Fla. 1975)
In 1960 decedent transferred stock in a family corporation' to his
wife as custodian 2 for their minor daughter. When the daughter
reached twenty-one, the stock was unconditionally reissued in her
name. Shortly thereafter she executed an inter vivos trust agreement
transferring her stock to a trust,8 naming her parents as trustees and
granting them absolute power to sell, exchange, assign, transfer, and
vote the stock.4  The Internal Revenue Service determined that the
decedent's powers as trustee warranted inclusion of the value of the
stock in his gross estate.' The estate paid the additional tax and initi-
1. The decedent formed A-B Distributors, Inc., in March 1960, and acted as
president of the corporation from its inception until his death. His wife was secretary,
and together they signed all stock certificates. Stock was issued to Mr. Reed, Mrs. Reed,
and the three Reed children. Estate of Reed v. United States, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
75-6413, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,477 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
2. Mrs. Reed served as custodian for their children under the Florida Gifts to
Minors Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 710.01 et. seq. (1969). Section 710.04 makes gifts to
minors irrevocable.
3. Although no transcript was made at the trial, both the government and plaintiff
later filed briefs. The evidence at trial showed that decedent suggested the trust when
his daughter was considering marriage. The daughter agreed to the creation of the trust
in order that all shares, and thus control of the corporation, remain in the family. Brief
for Defendant at 12, Estate of Reed v. United States, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-6413,
75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,477 (M.D. Fla. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant];
Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief at 2, Estate of Reed v. United States, 36 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 75-6413, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,477 (M.D. Fla. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Plain-
tiffs Supplemental Brief].
4. Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief at 4, Estate of Reed v. United States, 36 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 75-6413, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,477 (M.D. Fla. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Plaintiff]. These powers clearly bring the trust property within INT. Rnv.
COD OF 1954, § 2038(a)(1), if reserved by the transferor. This issue was undisputed.
Brief for Defendant at 3, 5.
5. The deficiency notice provided:
It is determined that the value of the. . . property. . . transferred by the de-
cedent in his lifetime is includible in the gross estate pursuant to the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 2038, since the enjoyment of
this property was subject at the date of his death to change through the exercise
of a power by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any other person, to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate.
Estate of Reed v. United States, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-6413, 75-6414, 75-1 U.S.
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ated suit for refund. The district court entered judgment for the tax-
payer and held: Section 2038(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of
19546 applies only when the power held by the decedent arises either
from a direct reservation in the transferring instrument or from the con-
ditions of the original transfer.'
Tax Cas. 87,477, 87,478 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
During his lifetime the decedent issued 384 shares of corporate stock to his daughter.
When the trust was created, the daughter held 160 shares, all of which were placed in the
trust. Thereafter, 224 shares were issued as stock dividends and 128 were removed from
the trust and issued directly to the daughter. Thus, at the decedent's death there ap-
peared to be 32 shares in the trust and 352 shares in the daughter's hands. The court
followed this accounting. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6416, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at
87,479.
The Commissioner sought inclusion of all 384 shares in decedent's gross estate, argu-
ing that the trust had legal title to all shares and that the parties intended all shares
to be placed in the trust. The trust instrument provided that the trustees were to con-
sider all additional stock dividends as trust corpus. Brief for Defendant at 15-16. It was
undisputed that all 224 shares issued after the creation of the trust were issued as stock
dividends, At trial plaintiffs admitted that all stock was intended to be included in the
trust, In fact, after the decedent died all 384 shares were called in and reissued to
Mrs. Reed as trustee. Brief for Defendant at 3, 15-16.
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a) provides:
(a) In general.
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property.
() Transfers after June 22, 1936.
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer. . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof
was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a
power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the
decedent in conjunction with any other person (without regard to when or
from what source the decedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, re-
voke, or terminate ....
(2) Transfers on or before June 22, 1936.
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer. . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power,
either by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any person, to alter,
amend, or revoke . ...
The main distinction between subsections (1) and (2) of § 2038 is the addition of the
phrase "without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power"
to subsection (1) dealing with post-1936 transfers. Subsection (2) is essentially the
same as § 302(d) of the Revenue Act of Jan. 1, 1924, ch. 234, § 302(d), 43 Stat.
304, quoted in note 13 infra.
Section 2038(a) (1) operates to bring the transferred interest into the decedents gross
estate under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031. The predecessor to § 2038(a)(1) was
held constitutional in Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
7. Estate of Reed v. United States, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-6413, 75-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 87,477 (M.D. Fla. 1975). There are several important issues which the court either
decided without explanation or neglected to address. One concerned the amount of stock
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Estate taxes are taxes on the transfer of property at death.8 They
can, however, be easily avoided if limited strictly to postdeath trans-
fers. To prevent one method of tax avoidance, Congress imposed an
estate tax on inter vivos transfers when the decedent held at his death
some "string" on the transferred property. 10 Congress reasoned that
the decedent's death ended his control, thereby passing valuable assur-
ance of title to the donee."' Since the donor by using the retained
subject to decedent's control for purposes of § 2038. See note 5 supra. A second issue
was plaintiffs constitutional attack on the application of the section to him. Plaintiff ar-
gued that if the means are inappropriate to the ends (prevention of tax avoidance),
the statute violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Plaintiff maintained
that operation of the statute in this fact situation would be an unreasonable means of
preventing tax avoidance. See Brief for Plaintiff at 15-16. A third issue was whether
the statutory language of § 2038(a) (1)-"which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer"-operates in conjunction with or limits the parenthetical phrase "without
regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power." The court's de-
cision, requiring that decedent's power derive from the original transfer, implied that
the first phrase does limit the second. A fourth issue was whether an express or implied
agreement between the decedent and his daughter created liability under § 2038 (a) (1).
See notes 5 supra and 19 infra.
8. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 346-47 (1921); Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 57, 59 (1900); Revenue Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 201, 39
Stat. 756, 777; Treas. Reg. § 20.0-2(a) (1958); C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD,
FDERAL SrTATE AND GrFr TAXES 99 1.1, 1.2 & 2.1 (3d ed. 1974); Lowndes, An
Introduction to the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1965).
9. A taxpayer could, for example, retain enjoyment of the property until death and
escape taxation by making an inter vivos transfer and retaining a life estate or a power
to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate. See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, supra
note 8, § 2.1, at 7-9; Lowndes, A Day in the Supreme Court With the Federal Estate
Tax, 22 VA. L. REv. 261, 276 (1936); Lowndes, supra note 8, at 4.
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a), quoted in note 6 supra; Helvering v. City
Bank Co., 296 U.S. 85, 90 (1935). The powers to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the
enjoyment of the transferred property are often referred to as "strings." See, eg.,
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108, 111 (1944); Trust Co. v.
Allen, 164 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 856 (1948); Estate of
Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114, 125 (1969), afj'd, 450 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1971).
11. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1924) and S. REP. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1924) both state:
Such property interests should therefore fairly be taxed as part of the dece-
dent's estate, particularly since, by virtue of his death, the substantial interest
which he had has been wiped out, and to the same extent the property interest
of the legal title holder, his transferee, has been increased.
See also Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 444 (1933); Mellon v. Driscoll, 117
F.2d 477, 478-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 579 (1941). In construing a predeces-
sor of § 2038, the Porter Court stated:
But the reservation here may not be ignored. . . it made the settlor dominant
in respect of the other dispositions of both corpus and income, his death ter-
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strings could revoke the transfer until his death, the transfer was in
effect a substitute for a testamentary disposition and could be taxed as
such.12
Section 302(d) of the Revenue Act of 1924 was the first statute to
impose an estate tax on revocable transfers.' 3 This statute focused on
the control decedent retained "at the date of his death" over the trans-
ferred property and did not require that control be reserved at the time
minated that control, ended the possibility of any change by him, and was, in
respect of title to the property in question, the source of valuable assurance
passing from the dead to the living. That is the event on which Congress
based the inclusion of property so transferred in the gross estate . . . . Thus
was reached what it reasonably might deem a substitute for testamentary dis-
position.
288 U.S. at 444.
Other federal estate tax statutes impose a tax on lifetime transfers testamentary in
nature. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035 (transactions in contemplation of
death); 2036 (transfers with retained life estates); 2037 (transfers taking effect at
death); 2041 (powers of appointment); 2042 (proceeds of life insurance).
12. See Whitney v. State Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 530, 531 (1940); Estate of Sanford
v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939); Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 444
(1933); Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 338 (1929); Mellon v.
Driscoll. 117 F.2d 477, 478-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 579 (1941).
13. Revenue Act of Jan. 1, 1924, ch. 234, § 302(d), 43 Stat. 304, provides:
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible
o intangible, wherever situated-
td) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created a
trust, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any
change through the exercise of a power. . . to alter, amend, or revoke ....
For the legislative history of § 302(d), see H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1924), and S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1924), quoted in note 11 supra.
For the treasury regulations, see Treas. Reg. 68, § 302(d), T.D. 3683, 27 TREAS. DEC.
INT. REV. 105 (1925).
Prior to the enactment of § 302(d) in 1924, revocable transfers were sometimes taxed
as transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death." See, e.g.,
Revenue Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777-78 (now INT. REV. CODE
or 1954, §§ 2036, 2037). More often, however, the state and federal courts allowed
revocable transfers to escape taxation. This inconsistency of enforcement was the
motivating force behind the enactment of § 302(d). See In re Miller's Estate, 236 N.Y.
290, 140 N.E. 701 (1923); C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, supra note 8, §
8.1. at 142; R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 7.06, at 301 (1942);
Rottschaeffer, Taxation of Transfers Taking Effect in Possession at the Grantor's Death,
26 IowA L. REV. 514, 531 (1941); Note, The Federal Estate Tax and Revocable Trusts,
30 ILL. L. REV. 361, 362 (1935). But see Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S.
339, 345 (1929) (revocable transfers taxable as a transfer "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at death").
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of the transfer.14 In White v. Poor,'0 however, the Supreme Court held
that section 302(d) applied only when the control held at death was
reserved at the time of the original transfer.' 6 To include the trans-
ferred property in the decedent's gross estate, White required a reser-
vation of power at the time of the transfer by the terms of the trans-
ferring instrument,17 by operation of law,' 8 or by express or implied
agreements.' 9 In response to White, Congress in 1936 amended section
14. Revenue Act of Jan. 1, 1924, ch. 234, § 302(d), 43 Stat. 304, quoted in note 13
supra.
15. 296 U.S. 98 (1935). During her lifetime decedent conveyed property to herself
and two others as trustees. The trustees, acting jointly, had the power to alter the trust
and to fill trustee vacancies. The decedent served as trustee for one year and then
resigned. The replacement trustee resigned after a year and the decedent was reappoint-
ed trustee. She served in this capacity until death. Id. at 100. The court held that §
302(d) was not applicable because the decedent acquired her powers solely by action of
the other trustees, whereas the statute contemplated powers reserved at the time of the
original transfer. Id. at 102.
The White decision was followed in two other cases involving pre-1936 transfers:
Fabian v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1954) and Estate of Franklin W.M.
Cutcheon, 3 T.C. 636 (1944). For a discussion of the problems that White created in
the operation of § 302(d), see Lowndes, supra note 9, at 276.
16. White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 102 (1935). The Court also held that § 302(d)
operated only when the grantor retained the powers as "settlor;" if the grantor retained
powers as trustee the section would not apply. Id. at 102. When Congress amended §
302(d) in 1936, it provided that the statute operate on a power "in whatever capacity
exercisable" by the decedent. See Revenue Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 805(a), 49
Stat. 1744-45, quoted in note 20 infra. The statute now operates even when the decedent
holds powers as trustee. The regulations take the position that this change was
declaratory of existing law. Treas. Reg. 80, § 805, T.D. 4729, 1937-1 CuM. BULL. 286-
88, quoted in note 35 infra. The capacity in which the powers are exercisable is now
irrelevant. See Union Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 138 F.2d 152, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944); Welch v. Terhune, 126 F.2d 695, 697 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 644 (1942).
17. White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 102 (1935).
18. Id.; Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1942).
19. White v. Poor, 296 U.S. 98, 102 (1935); Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(c) (1958)
provides:
The phrase [reserved at the time of the transfer] also has reference to any
understanding, express or implied, had in connection with the making of the
transfer that the power would later be created or conferred.
This regulation is titled "Transfers made before June 22, 1936" and states that an
agreement to return control of the property to the transferor will be treated as a
reservation at the time of the transfer. If an agreement has this effect, it should cause §
2038 to apply to both pre- and post-1936 transfers. Thus, although the regulation refers
to pre-1936 transfers, its application should not be limited to those transactions. No cases
have relied on this regulation, but a similar provision appears in the regulations for §
2036, see Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a)(ii) (1958), and has been cited in several cases to
support the finding that the transferor reserved a life estate at the time of the transfer.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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302(d) to include the phrase "without regard to when or from what
source the decedent acquired such power," 0 which was intended to
negate this requirement.21 The 1936 amendment was codified in the
See Estate of Skinner v. United States, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963); Estate of McNichol
v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959); Atkinson
v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Fitzsinmons v. United States, 222
F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Wash. 1963).
The Reed court required that decedent's powers derive either from a direct reservation
at the time of the transfer or "from the conditions of the original transfer." 36 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6416, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480. Though the court
never defined "conditions," it probably meant some mechanism in the original trans-
ferring instrument that would allow the transferor to regain control of the prop-
erty. For example, a provision allowing the grantor to appoint himself trustee
at any time would be a condition resulting in taxation. The court did not men-
tion Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(c) (1958). Agreements to return control should
be conditions, but since the court did not inquire into the presence of any such agree-
ments, it implied that such agreements will not create § 2038 (a) (1) liability.
Arguably, there were such agreements between the decedent and his daughter. The
original gifts of stock are suspect because they involved intrafamily gifts of stock in the
family corporation. For a description of how the stock was issued, see note 5 supra. But
even if there were no implied agreements at the time of the original gifts, there was an
express agreement in the trust instrument that all future stock dividends would be part of
the trust corpus. See id. This should suffice to bring the 224 shares issued as stock
dividends into the decedent's estate. Two problems arise: 1) are stock dividend
transfers from a decedent who controlled the issuing corporation, and 2) are such
agreements sufficient to cause § 2038(a)(1) to apply after the Reed decision? If such
agreements are insufficient to bring transferred property into the decedent's estate, Reed
has provided a clear method of tax avoidance.
20. Revenue Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 805(a), 49 Stat. 1744-45, amending
Revenue Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 302(d) (1), 44 Stat. 71, provided:
(a) Section 302(d)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1926, as amended, is amended
to read as follows:
"(d)(1) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment
thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise
of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent . . . (without
regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power), to al-
ter, amend, revoke, or terminate .
Id. (emphasis added).
By the Revenue Act of June 22, 1936, Congress made three major amendments to
§ 302(d), First, it added the phrase "in whatever capacity exercisable." See note 16 su-
pia. Second, Congress added the word "terminate" to the powers included in § 302(d).
This amendment also responded to White, which had raised the question whether a pow-
er to terminate is the equivalent of a power to revoke. Congress, the Treasury, and the
couits considered the amendment to be declaratory of existing law. See H.R. REP. No.
2818, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1936), quoted in note 34 infra; Treas. Reg. 80, § 805,
T.D. 4729, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 286, 287, quoted in note 35 infra; Commissioner v.
Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1946). Third, Congress added the phrase
"without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power."
21. See H.R. REP. No. 2818, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1936), quoted in note 34 infra.
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Internal Revenue Code of 1939,22 and then renumbered as section
2038(a)(1) in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, without material
change.
In Estate of Reed v. United States23 the court confronted the ques-
tion whether section 2038(a)(1) extended to all after-acquired powers
or only those arising from the conditions of the original transfer.24
The court determined that the issue turned on the interpretation given
the phrase "without regard to when or from what source the decedent
acquired such power."2 5  Although recognizing that this phrase was
added in response to White,26 the court stated that both before and
after 1936 the statute applied to transfers in which the decedent's
power was reserved at the time of the original transfer.2 7  Absent con-
See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958), quoted in note 35 infra; Rev. Rul. 70-348,
1972-2 CuM. BULL. 193; 3 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFr AND ESTATE
TAXAnTON § 25.18-.19 (1959); Note, Section 2038: Present Economic Benefit v.
Technical Vesting of Title or Estates, 13 W. Rns. L. REv. 737, 740 (1962).
22. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 3, § 811(d), 53 Stat. 121-22 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 2038).
23. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-6413, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,477 (M.D. Fla.
1975).
24. The issue could be stated whether Congress intended the 1936 amendments to
negate entirely the White requirement that the decedent's power be reserved at the time
of the original transfer.
25. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6416, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480. Although
never stating the issue directly, the court did recognize that the outcome of the case
turned on this phrase.
26. The court cited the facts of White incorrectly, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-
6416, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480, in stating that decedent was not an original trustee
of her trust. See note 15 supra. Although the Supreme Court would probably have
reached the same result on these facts, the error indicates the sloppiness of the Reed
opinion.
27. The court stated:
At all times prior and subsequent to the statutory amendment of 1936...
the provision relating to revocable transfers has been applied to bring into the
gross estate of a transferor. . . the values of property interests over which the
transferor retained or reserved certain powers or control at the time of the orig-
inal transfer.
Id. at 75-6416, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480 (emphasis original). The court
implied that its search produced many § 2038 cases dealing with reserved pow-
ers, but no cases involving after-acquired powers. This interpretation is supported
by the court's reliance on Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1972). The Skifter court stated bluntly that it found no cases dealing with after-
acquired powers:
The emphasized language [without regard to when or from what source the
decedent acquired such power] would appear to indicate that § 2038 would ap-
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trary authority, the court reasoned that Congress intended the 1936
amendment merely to alter the outcome of the specific White situation
in which after-acquired powers had arisen from the conditions of the
original transfer.28  Because this decedent's powers did not so arise,
the court excluded the transferred stock from his gross estate. The
court ignored the legislative history of the statute and instead relied on
the interpretation given section 2038(a)(1) by three circuit court deci-
sions dealing with estate taxation of insurance proceeds. 29
ply even when the power was acquired under circumstances such as are present
here. However, there is no indication that the Commissioner has ever made
such an argument and we have been able to find no case applying § 2038 in
this manner.
. , . However, this language appears never to have been applied to a power
other than one that the decedent created at the time of the transfer in someone
else and that later devolved upon him before his death. In essence, the lan-
guage has been applied strictly to change the result in White v. Poor.
468 F.2d at 704.
The decedent in Skirter had irrevocably transferred life insurance policies on his life to
his wife. The wife predeceased her husband, and her will made the decedent trustee of a
trust containing the insurance policies. 468 F.2d at 701. The court held the policies
nontaxable. Id. at 705.
28. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6416, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480. See note
27 supra. For a discussion of the fallacy in this reasoning, see note 39 infra and accom-
panying text.
29. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6416 to 6417, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480. The
court cited three cases comparing the insurance tax section to § 2038, each of which
commented on the scope of § 2038:
I ) Under § 2036 Congress specifically levied the estate tax upon interests re-
tained by a decedent in connection with an incomplete transfer; and §
2038 is similar in effect.
Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1975) (emphasis original) (footnotes
omitted).
2) The only significant distinction between §§ 2036 and 2038 on the one
hand and § 2042 on the other is that under the former there must be an
incomplete transfer by the decedent whereas under the latter a transfer is
unnecessary. Thus under §§ 2036 and 2038 the decedent must have re-
tained some control over the property he initially transferred while under
§ 2042 it is enough if at death the decedent merely possessed an incident
of ownership, the means by which he came into possession being irrele-
vant.
Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
original) (footnote omitted).
3) The emphasized language [without regard to when or from what source
the decedent acquired such power] would appear to indicate that § 2038
would apply even where the power was acquired under circumstances such
as are present here. However, there is no indication that the Commis-
sioner has ever made such an argument and we have been able to find
no cases applying § 2038 in this manner.
. . . However, this language appears never to have been applied to a
power other than one that the decedent created at the time of the transfer
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The Reed court's opinion employed faulty logic and relied on weak
precedent rather than looking to the clear language and legislative
history of section 2038(a)(1). Traditional canons of statutory con-
struction dictate that a court should first look to the language of the
statute;30 if this does not resolve the issue, the court should then look
in someone else and that later devolved upon him before his death. In
essence, the language has been applied strictly to change the result in
White v. Poor.
Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1972).
Although each court discussed § 2038, the primary concern was with § 2042, The
statements on § 2038 in Rose and Lumpkin were plainly dicta; Skifter, while on point,
relied on the same fallacious reasoning employed in Reed, see notes 39, 40 & 45 infra
and accompanying text.
Similar considerations of "source" are involved in both §§ 2038 and 2042. Un-
der § 2042, the proceeds of an insurance policy on the decedent's life which are
payable to his estate are taxable to his estate. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(1).
If the proceeds are payable to beneficiaries other than the decedent, the decedent must
hold "incidents of ownership" in connection with the policies before the proceeds are
included in his estate. Id. at § 2042(2). Generally, incidents of ownership include the
right to change the beneficiaries, or cancel or assign the policies, or a reversionary
interest. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2-6) (1974). The statute does not state
whether the source of the incidents of ownership is important to its operation. The
courts thus must resolve whether § 2042 operates when a decedent unconditionally
assigns his policies to another, but holds incidents of ownership at his death. Skifter
answered this question in the negative, reasoning that § 2042 followed § 2038 which was
interpreted as requiring a reservation of power at the time of the transfer. In Lumpkin
and Rose the courts held that the source was irrelevant if decedent held incidents of
ownership at death.
In Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970), decedent's wife purchased
insurance on the decedent's life with her own funds. Id. at 81-82. She predeceased him,
devising the policies to a trust of which decedent was a life beneficiary and a co-trustee
with the power to sell or assign the policies. Id. The court held the policies includible
in his gross estate under § 2042. Id. at 86. The court's main concern was whether the
decedent's trustee status would exculpate him from liability; it largely ignored the issue
of whether a reservation of the incidents of ownership was required. The opinion is
nonetheless instructive. The likelihood of collusive agreements is clearly less when
decedent is not the original owner of the property than when he holds it initially,
transfers it, then subsequently acquires it again. On public policy grounds, therefore,
Skifter and Reed, which imposed no tax liability, present a stronger case for taxation
than Fruehauf, which included the insurance in decedent's taxable estate. For a
thorough analysis of these cases, see Eliasberg, I.R.C. Section 2042-The Estate Taxa-
tion of Life Insurance: What is an Incident of Ownership, 1973 INS. L.J. 7; CA-5 Puts
Insurance in Non-Grantor Trustee's Estate, Conflicts with CA-2 and CA-6, 43 J.
TAxAIoN 49 (1975); Note, Estate Taxation of Life Insurance Policies Held by the
Insured as Trustee, 32 MD. L REV. 305 (1972); Note, Estate Tax-The Other View of
Skifter, 39 Mo. L. REv. 258 (1974).
For the legislative history of § 2042, see H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
A316 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 124 (1954),
30. The plain meaning rule dictates that if language is clear and unambiguous it
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to the legislative history of the statute to determine its purpose.8 1 The
Reed court did neither. The language of section 2038(a)(1) specifi-
cally directs that it operate "without regard to when or from what source
the decedent acquired such power."32  The court disregarded the
ordinary interpretation of this language which clearly covers the
must be given effect except when it would lead to absurd consequences or subvert the
purpose of the statute. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1964); Helver-
ing v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249 (1940); Helvering v.
Hammell, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1940); Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296
U.S. 85, 89 (1935); Thompson v. United States, 246 U.S. 547, 551 (1918); Hamilton v.
Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899). See generally J. SurmaLAND, STATuToRY CON-
STRUCTIoN (4th ed. 1972); A Symposium on Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REv.
365 (1950); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Meaning of Statutes, 47 COLuM. L.
REV. 527 (1947); Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpreta-
tion of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939); Smith, The Changing Construction
of Revenue Laws, 20 A.B.A.J. 12 (1934); Willis, Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell,
16 CAN. B. Rnv. 1 (1938). The Reed court did not give effect to the plain meaning of
the statute and as a result subverted its purposes. See notes 46 & 47 infra and
accompanying text.
31. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1964); see note 30 supra.
32. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a)(1), quoted in note 6 supra. Section
2038(a) (1) is broad enough in scope to encompass the Reed problem. The source of
the decedent's power is immaterial to the operation of the section. See note 35 infra.
Note that Congress could have used narrower language had it wanted to limit the
application of § 2038(a) (1) to those after-acquired powers which arose from the condi-
tions of the original transfer. It could have said, for example, "without regard to when
the power was acquired so long as it derives from the original transfer." This would
have incorporated the White decision rather than overruling it. The Reed court, in ef-
fect, placed this language in the statute-an action it was not at liberty to take. See note
30 supra. An argument can be made that Congress did not use limiting language because
it wanted the courts to have discretion in applying the section. This argument is
particularly weak in connection with the reservation of powers. A comparison of §
2038(a)(1) with 09 2036 and 2037 shows that Congress placed a reservation require-
ment in the latter two, but not in the first. See note 11 supra. Section 2036 taxes
transferred property in which decedent has a life estate only when the life estate was
reserved at the time of the original transfer. Section 2037 taxes transfers intended to
take effect at death only when decedent retained a reversionary interest at the time of
the original transfer. Congress did not require a reservation of power in § 2038(a)(1)
and expressly negated such a requirement. See note 21 supra.
There are several other indications that Congress did not intend the source of
decedent's power to determine taxation. Since its codification in 1939, see note 22
supra, the statute has been entitled "Revocable Transfers" rather than "Transfers With
Reserved Powers." Also, § 2038 and all its predecessors have referred to powers held
at death rather than powers created at the time of the transfer and held until death.
See notes 6 & 13 supra. The Supreme Court in White was not persuaded by this language.
See note 15 supra. Since 1936 the Treasury Regulations have specifically directed that
for post-1936 transfers the source of the power is immaterial. See Treas. Reg. 80, § 805,
T.D. 4729, 1937-1 CuM. BULL. 286-88, quoted in note 35 infra.
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Reed transaction. 3 The Reed court also failed to examine the statute's
legislative history 4 or its interpretive regulations, 5 both of which are
33. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6416 to 6417, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480. When
Congress uses plain language in a statute, courts are not at liberty to apply their own
interpretations of the language. See notes 30-32 supra.
34. H.R. REP. No. 2818, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1936) (emphasis added) stated:
Section 206 amends section 302(d) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1926 ....
The changes made by this section are made necessary largely by reason of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of White v. Poor
.... The case, therefore, suggests that section 302(d) may be circumvented
in many ways so long as the power. . . does not accrue to the settlor by virtue
of the reservation in the trust instrument. It is, therefore, provided that section
302(d) covers a power whether created at the time of the transfer or thereafter
arising from any source and whether exercisable in any individual or repre-
sentative capacity. To some extent, it is believed this amendment is declara-
tory of existing law ....
Another change made . . . has been to expressly include a power to termi-
nate along with the powers to alter, amend, or revoke. In the case of White
v. Poor, supra, the Supreme Court did not pass on the question of whether the
power to terminate was included .. . . Since in substance a power to termi-
nate is the equivalent of a power to revoke, this question should be set at rest.
Express provision to that effect has been made and it is believed that it is de-
claratory of existing law.
. . In view of the increased estate tax rates, it is probable also that tax-
payers will be straining every effort to devise transfers which will permit them
to retain control of their property during their lifetime and escape the imposi-
tion of estate taxes thereon. The proposed amendments are designed to plug
up loop holes which now appear, so that taxpayers may not be successful in
effecting tax avoidance.
This report accompanied H.LR. 12793, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), a bill on estate
taxes that was not enacted. The House also submitted H.R. 12395, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936), which was similar to H.R. 12793. Both bills were rejected by the Senate, but the
Senate's amendment to H.R. 12395 included § 805(d) and, after slight modification by
the House, was passed and became law. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 3068, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1936). The developments are indexed in 80 CONe. REc. (PERM. ED.) pt. 11,
at 554 (1936).
The validity of the House Report accompanying H.R. 12793, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936), as an indication of congressional intent has never been questioned and the
Report has been cited with approval by several courts. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate
of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1946); Welch v. Terhune, 126 F.2d 695, 696 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 644 (1942); Estate of Franklin W.M. Cutcheon, 3 T.C. 636,
637 (1944). The Report clearly shows that Congress was concerned with tax avoidance
schemes that the White holding would have allowed. Moreover, the broad language of
the Report implies that Congress intended to go beyond White and extend the section to
any possible type of return of power.
35. The Treasury Regulations for Revenue Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 690, § 805(a),
49 Stat. 1744-45, (now INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2038) specifically stated that the
section operated on after-acquired powers regardless of the source of the power:
(b) Taxability.-The property or interests so transferred shall be included in
the gross estate if coming within any one of the following paragraphs:
(2) When the transfer was made .. before the amendment of the subdivi-
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consistent with the plain meaning of the section. The House Report
states that the statute operated on powers reserved at the time of the
transfer or "thereafter arising from any source,"'36 while the Regulations
provide that the source of the power is "immaterial.13 7
The court reasoned that since no cases involving after-acquired
powers had reached the courts, while many reserved power cases had,
Congress must have intended section 2038(a)(1) to apply to after-
acquired powers only if, as in White, they arose from the conditions
of the original transfer. 8 This is fallacious.3" The absence of case law
sion by the Revenue Act of 1936 ... and the decedent's death occurred at
any time subsequent to the transfer, and the power was reserved at the time
of the transfer ....
(3) When the transfer was made and the decedent died after June 22, 1936
. . . and the power was either reserved at the time of the transfer or later cre-
ated or conferred, without regard to the source from which the power was ac-
quired ....
Treas. Reg. 80, § 805, T.D. 4729, 1937-1 CuM. BuLL. 286-88 (emphasis added).
The Treasury Regulations for § 2038 continued the distinction between pre- and post-
1936 transfers. As in the earlier regulations, cited supra, the White rule controls pre-
1936 transfers, but for post-1936 transfers, the source of the power is immaterial:
(a) (3) [in reference to transfers made after June 22, 1936]-Except as pro-
vided in this paragraph, it is immaterial. . . at what time or from what source
the decedent acquired his power ....
(c) mhe value of an interest in property transferred by the decedent be-
fore June 22, 1936, is not included in his gross estate under section 2038 un-
less the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate was reserved at the time
of the transfer. For purposes of this paragraph, the phrase "reserved at the
time of the transfer" . . . has reference to any understanding, express or im-
plied, had in connection with the making of the transfer that the power would
later be created or conferred.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (1958) (emphasis added).
36, H.R. REP. No. 2818, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1936), quoted in note 34 supra.
37. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (1958), quoted in note 35 supra.
38. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6416 to 6417, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480 (M.D.
Fla. 1975). The court's statement is quoted in note 27 supra.
39, The type of cases arising under a statute has no bearing on congressional intent.
Since 1936 only two cases other than Reed have arisen involving after-acquired powers,
and both dealt with pre-1936 transfers. Fabian v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 726
(D. Conn. 1954); Estate of Franklin W.M. Cutcheon, 3 T.C. 636 (1944). The absence
of cases shows either that decedents have not held after-acquired powers at death
sufficient to cause operation of § 2038, or that the parties have not taken these cases to
the courts for determination. One reason for the absence of litigation may be that
attorneys recognized that § 2038 would apply in such circumstances and have advised
their clients not to accept such returns of power. It is illogical to suggest that the
absence of judicial authority indicates congressional intent or lends support to one
construction over another. See H. KAH&NE, Looic AND CoNTEMPoRARY RHEToRic 56
(1971).
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construing a statute does not itself support one construction over
another.40  The court may have been swayed by its belief that imposi-
tion of the tax on the Reed estate would cause hardship.4" When the
statute is clear, however, hardship should not influence the court's
decision.42
The court's heavy reliance on three insurance tax decisions48 inter-
preting section 2038 was unwarranted. The discussion in two of these
cases was dictum, 44 the third, although on point, relied on the same
faulty logic as Reed.48 In essence, section 2038(a)(1), after the 1936
40. The two cases that followed White involved transfers made before 1936.
Fabian v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1954); Estate of Franklin W.M.
Cutcheon, 3 T.C. 636 (1944). Reed was the first case to test whether § 2038(a)(1)
applied to post-1936 unconditional transfers when the decedent held after-acquired
powers at death. See note 39 supra.
41. The court stated that the decedent had made a "complete, absolute disposition"
and only because of a "totally unrelated and fortuitous reconveyance" did he have any
control over the property at his death. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6417, 75-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. at 87,480. The reconveyance might not have been either fortuitous or unrelated
because the decedent asked his daughter to create the trust. See note 3 supra. For
a discussion of express or implied agreements between the decedent and his daughter,
see notes 5 & 19 supra.
42. Clear statutory language should apply regardless of hardship. J.E. Riley Inv.
Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55, 59 (1941). If the language is plain, courts must
assume that Congress considered the possibility of hardship and decided that the benefits
of the statute outweighed the burdens of hardship. Id. For a discussion of the plain
meaning rule, see note 30 supra. The Supreme Court has stated that it will not grant
relief for hardship created by the plain meaning of a statute:
Petitioner urges that this result will produce hardship here .... That may
be the basis for an appeal to Congress in amelioration of the strictness of that
section. But it is no ground for relief by the courts from the rigors of the
statutory choice which Congress has provided.
J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 59 (1941). See also Helvering v. Lerner
Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1942); McClain v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 527, 530
(1941); Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of
Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L RaV. 779 (1941). Surrey contends that the tax
laws must be more specific because the judiciary develops standards too slowly and often
inadequately. He discussed two clear problems created by particularity: 1) hardship;
and 2) tax avoidance schemes based on strict interpretation of the statute. To overcome
these problems Surrey suggests that courts should intervene to halt tax avoidance, but
should leave amelioration of hardship to the taxpayer up to the Congress, which could
use private relief bills and, in recurring situations, retroactive amendment of the statute
to solve the problems. Id. at 808-13.
43. Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975); Estate of Lumpkin v.
Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973); Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972). See note 29 supra.
44. Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975); Estate of Lumpkin v.
Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973). See note 29 supra.
45. Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972). Skifter
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amendment, presumed all transfers of property, the enjoyment of
which was subject to the transferor's control at his death, to be testa-
mentary in nature and taxed them as such.46 The Reed holding denies
effect to this presumption. 47 If Reed were followed, courts must exam-
concerned insurance policies originally held by decedent and unconditionally assigned to
his wife, who in turn devised them to a trust and named decedent as trustee. The Skirter
opinion, while hardly a model of clarity, relied on two distinct theories to exclude these
policies from taxation: each was premised on the belief that § 2038 applied only to
retained powers. First, the court reasoned that the absence of a beneficial interest in the
insurance policies meant decedent lacked the necessary incidents of ownership. The
Commissioner argued that § 2042 did not require such a beneficial interest if decedent
held incidents of ownership at death, citing cases dealing with § 2038. The court refuted
this argument by construing § 2038 to require a retained interest. Id. at 703. Second,
the court construed § 2042 in pad materia with the rest of the estate tax code, id. at 702;
hence, the retention requirement of § 2038 also applied to § 2042.
The premise of the court's holding-that § 2038 required an originally retained
interest-rested on a weak foundation. The court reasoned that § 2038 had never before
been applied in such situations. Id. at 704, quoted in notes 27 & 29 supra. Before Reed,
however, no court had rejected such a construction since the issue had simply not been
litigated. The absence of case law construing a particular rule does not support one
conclusion over another. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. The Skifter court
also thought that estate planning would be disrupted by a contrary ruling. Donors
choose to divest themselves of powers based on anticipated tax consequences, dispositions
which would be upset if property transferred unconditionally were later to return, at least
in part, to decedent's control. 468 F.2d at 703. Because trustees can always decline to
accept a position in which they have such powers, this argument is not convincing. Of
greater concern is the ease of tax avoidance under the Reed construction. See notes 46-
50 infra and accompanying text.
46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a)(1), quoted in note 6 supra. For a
discussion of the purposes of the statute and the intent of Congress, see notes 10 & 11
supra and accompanying text. With few exceptions, the statute taxes the value of all
transferred property when the transferor held some control over the property at his
death. The source of the power is immaterial. See note 35 supra. Thus, the taxpayer
who transfers property to avoid taxation must not allow control of the property ever to
revest since if he died holding such powers, the value of the transferred property would
be includible in his gross estate under § 2038(a)(1). The propriety of such a rule is
not for the courts to decide. See note 42 supra. The section exempts transfers for bona
fide consideration, and some courts exempt transfers when the control decedent held at
death was minimal. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a)(1); United States v. Powell,
307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962) (decedent's investment powers and his power to invade
trust corpus not included in § 2038(a)(1) because they were limited to judi-
cially enforceable external standards); Estate of Edward E. Ford, 53 T.C. 114
(1969), a'f'd, 450 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1971) (same). Neither of these exceptions is
applicable to Reed.
47. See note 7 supra and accompanying text and note 46 supra. Other than
White, the only case cited by the Reed court specifically dealing with revoca-
ble transfers was Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942), which is
of little precedential value since it dealt only with pre-1936 law. In Howard, decedent
and his wife were Louisiana residents, and under state law all gifts between spouses
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ine the conditions of the original transfer to find an express or implied
agreement that the donee was to reconvey control to the donor in order
to find section 2038(a)(1) liability when the transferor does not di-
rectly reserve control. While such an agreement would create liabil-
ity,4 8 this decision tempts taxpayers to make this type of transfer, gam-
bling that a court would not imply such an agreement.49 Reed thus re-
introduces the problems Congress sought to avoid by enacting the 1936
amendment."0 A better interpretation of section 2038(a)(1) which
considers the plain language and legislative history would avoid these
problems and properly carry out the purposes of the statute. 1 Reed
should not be followed.5 2
during marriage were revocable. Prior to the 1936 amendments, decedent made
gifts to his wife and died while holding this statutory power to revoke. The
decedent argued that under White § 302(d) would not apply to transfers when the
power to revoke was not reserved in the transferring instrument. The court held the
value of the gifts includible in the decedent's gross estate and stated:
The revenue statute does not create any distinction as to the source of the
power to revoke. It has been uniformly construed to operate alike upon all
gifts rendered incomplete by a reservation in the donor of a power to revoke.
Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1942).
48. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(c) (1958), quoted in note 19 supra.
49. 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 75-6416 to 6417, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480.
50. See notes 19 supra & 51 infra.
51. Some of the problems created by this decision are discussed in note 19 supra.
The major problems would involve proof of the parties' intentions. The statute does not
require the parties to have intended to reserve a power, but for a court to imply an
agreement to return a power it would have to examine the parties' intentions. The
obvious problem is that by the time the case reaches the court one of the parties to the
agreement is dead. Another problem arises from the court's language. The court stated
that the statute was intended to apply when the decedent "sets machinery in motion
which purposefully allows fiduciary powers . . . to return to him." 36 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d at 75-6416, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,480. The court's language might mean that
the decedent must intend the provision in the transferring instrument be used to return
control to him. A taxpayer might argue that it was not his intention to have the provi-
sion used to return control to him. For example, did the decedent in White intend
the provision in her trust allowing the appointment of new trustees to be used to return
power to her? The proper interpretation should be that the decedent intended to create
a mechanism to cope with unforeseen circumstances-the resignation of a trustee in
White-and the mechanism was, in fact, used to return control to him.
If the clear language of the statute is followed, none of these problems arise. Congress,
by the use of broad language, sought to avoid the problems Reed has recreated. The
benefits gained from a strict statutory interpretation outweigh the hardships such an
interpretation creates. Reed allows a perfect means of tax avoidance.
52. On August 14, 1975, the Solicitor General decided not to appeal Reed. Letter
from Rodger A. Moore to author, Aug. 28, 1975. Appeal was not filed within the
statutory period. Fed. R. App. P.4(a) (30 days).
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